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A COMPREHENSIVE MAPPING OF CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION: A 
THREE PILLAR APPROACH(1)  
 
Dennis J.D. Sandole  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
 
As I contemplate the rise worldwide in intrastate (in contrast to interstate) conflicts (see, e.g., 
van Creveld, 1991 and K. Holsti, 1996), leading to Yugoslavian and Rwandan-type situations, I 
sense the need to do something about them. As Rousseau has said, "wars occur because there is 
nothing to prevent them" (cited in Waltz, 1959, p. 232). And quite frankly, there are few, if any, 
mechanisms worldwide relevant to staving off a future Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and the like (see 
Lund, 1996): witness the unfolding of the violent Albanian-Serbian conflict in Kosovo into a 
possible, wider Balkan war (see, e.g., Nordland and Watson, 1998; Finn, 1999; Dinmore, 1999a, 
1999b)!  
Before proceeding further, let me provide some basic definitions. Conflict, for me, is a dynamic 
phenomenon, a "manifest conflict process" (MCP), characterized by phases of initiation, 
escalation, controlled maintenance, and management, perhaps leading to some kind of 
termination reflective of settlement, resolution, or transformation (see Sandole, 1993, p. 6).(2) A 
manifest conflict process (MCP) is a situation in which at least two parties, or their 
representatives, try to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by undermining, 
directly or indirectly, each other's goal-seeking capability (ibid.). A conflict in this sense is not 
necessarily a bad  
thing; indeed, it may be an "early warning" sign that something has gone wrong in an otherwise 
important relationship that needs to be addressed before it gets worse.  
What does concern me is if the MCP does, in fact, get worse, producing what I call an aggressive 
manifest conflict process (AMCP): a situation in which at least two parties, or their 
representatives, attempt to pursue their perceptions of mutually incompatible goals by physically 
damaging or destroying the property and high-value symbols of one another (e.g., religious 
shrines, national monuments); and/or psychologically or physically injuring, destroying, or 
otherwise forcibly eliminating one another (ibid., p. 7).  
An obvious question that comes to mind here is: How can we prevent MCPs from becoming 
AMCPs? A preliminary question, however, is: How do MCPs become AMCPs? Before we can 
know something about how to prevent "future Yugoslavias," we have to know something about 
the causes and conditions of the genocidal unraveling of Yugoslavia itself.  
The comprehensive mapping of conflict and conflict resolution proposed here is not only 
relevant, but facilitates answers, to these interrelated questions. It is based on the assumption that 
"mapping" any particular conflict in terms of various categories -- e.g., (i) conflict; (ii) conflict 
causes and conditions; and (iii) conflict intervention perspectives and processes -- constitutes a 
preliminary step to designing and implementing an effective intervention into it. As Paul Wehr 
(1979, p. 18) puts it: "Mapping is a first step in intervening to manage a particular conflict" 
(emphasis added).  
Although, prescriptively, an effective intervention ought to depend upon knowing something 
about any given conflict and its causes and conditions before intervening into it, descriptively, 
there is a "two-culture problem" between the academic and other researchers who study and 
theorize about conflicts and the practitioners who actually try to intervene in them. My objective 
here, therefore, is to propose and outline such a mapping in a manner that connects theory to 
practice, to maximize the prospects that interventions will be effective: unless we know what 
makes conflicts "tick," we may, good intentions to the contrary, only make matters worse.  
Given that we are concerned here with conflict at all levels -- e.g., interpersonal, intergroup, 
interorganizational, intersocietal -- the mapping presented below is suggestive of generic theory. 
The premise is that a "generic theory" will be useful, not just for explaining, but for responding 
to conflict at all levels, including the violent ethnic conflict and warfare of the post-Cold War 
era.  
Generic theory in conflict and conflict resolution has been a contentious issue (e.g., see Burton 
and Sandole, 1986; Avruch and Black, 1987), with no clear resolution in sight. On the one hand, 
Kenneth Boulding (1962) thought such a theory possible, differences between levels 
notwithstanding, and went some way toward developing one. On the other hand, Anatol 
Rapoport (1974, pp. 7-10) -- despite (or precisely because of) his own efforts in this regard -- had 
his doubts about a general theory of war as well as a general theory of conflict. Somewhere in 
between is John Vasquez (1993, p. 306) who, while he believes that a unified theory of conflict 
and violence is possible, does not feel the same about a generic theory of war (ibid., p. 49):  
 
[Given] the assumption of multicausality, or equifinality, ..., trying to delineate the causes of war 
by only studying wars in the hopes of finding a common pattern will not be successful. ... In 
terms of policy relevance, this means that even if some causal sequences of war are identified 
and eliminated, war may still be caused by other factors. This makes the task of bringing about 
permanent peace arduous and complicated.  
 
Our approach reflects Boulding's (1962, pp. viii, 1-2) view that:  
 
It seems reasonable to suppose that conflict [of which war is a special case] does exhibit many 
general patterns, that the patterns of conflict in industrial relations, international relations, 
interpersonal relations and even animal life are not wholly different from one another, and that it 
is, therefore, worth looking for the common element (emphasis added) (also see Wehr, 1979; 
Mitchell, 1981; and Kriesberg, 1982).  
 
The mapping which follows, therefore, reflects one attempt to find that "common element," and 
it does so at two levels: at the macro level it provides a framework for organizing information on 
the entire field of conflict analysis and resolution and, by "deduction," it provides, at the micro 
level, a potentially useful framework for organizing information on any particular conflict.  
As Figure 1 shows, we can locate conflict (pillar 1) in the middle of the map, with conflict 
causes and conditions (pillar 2) to the left, and conflict intervention (pillar 3) to the right of it. In 
this way (and in any case), it is clear that conflict is the central focus, our primary "subject 
matter": the thing that we have to explain or predict in order to respond effectively -- to prevent, 
manage, settle, resolve, transform, or otherwise deal with it.  
 
CONFLICT (PILLAR 1)  
 
Under conflict -- latent conflict (pre-MCPs), MCPs, and AMCPs -- conflict analysts and 
potential third parties would want to know something about: (a) the parties; (b) the issues about 
which the parties are conflicting; (c) the objectives they hope to reach by conflicting over those 
issues; (d) the means they are employing to achieve those goals; (e) their orientations to conflict 
and conflict handling; and (f) the nature of the environments within which their conflict occurs 
and their efforts to deal with it are played out.  
 
 
 
Figure 1:  
A Comprehensive Mapping of Conflict and Conflict Resolution:  
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The first, and most obvious, question that comes to mind here with regard to any given conflict 
is, "Who are the parties?" As indicated above, the parties may be, among others, individuals, 
groups, organizations, societies, and/or regions. One great constancy across levels, however, is 
that the individual constitutes the basic unit of explanation, regardless of what specific level(s) 
one focuses on, because individuals are decisionmakers at all levels (see Burton, 1984, p. 19).  
The conflict analyst can begin to ascertain who the parties are by reading through the appropriate 
literature on the conflict in question, and by interviewing governmental and nongovernmental 
experts on the conflict and region[s] wherein the conflict is occurring. Conflict analysts can also 
begin to interview the parties themselves to fill in the blanks -- thereby reinforcing the idea that 
an appreciation of interview skills and data analysis would be useful (see Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias, 1996, Ch. 10; Moore, 1986, Ch. 5; and Sandole, forthcoming) -- to get at the 
parties' act meaning, complementing the action meaning provided by observers (e.g., the 
governmental and nongovernmental experts).(3) The point is to ensure that in any subsequent 
third party intervention, all voices are represented and heard. If they are not, those not inside the 
"house" might not have any stake in preserving it -- preventing it from "burning down."(4) Once 
efforts are initiated to bring the conflicting parties together, it would be useful to know if they are 
to be self- or other-represented.(5) As conflicts move along the social-organizational gradient 
from the interpersonal to international levels, they tend to move from self- to other-
representation. In a divorce mediation, for example, the primary parties -- the husband and wife -
- can represent themselves; in contrast to, say, an international mediation over access to water, 
where the group parties will be represented by "others": individuals who may be "insiders" (e.g., 
diplomats acting on behalf of their governments) or "outsiders" (e.g., lawyers working under 
contract).  
Whether parties are self- or other-represented, however --which introduces into our analysis 
distinctions between focal (primary) and nonfocal (secondary or interested third) parties (see 
Kriesberg, 1982; Wehr, 1979) -- does not depend only on their "level-of-analysis" location. If the 
divorcing husband and wife, for example, decide to opt for litigation, they may be represented by 
lawyers. But even if they elect to stay with mediation, they may still be represented by lawyers in 
the evaluation and monitoring of the implementation of their agreement. On the other hand, an 
international negotiation between two heads of state will involve, in part, the two principals 
themselves.  
The point here for conflict analysts and potential third parties to keep in mind is, the more that 
the parties are represented by "others," the more that "others" will have to confer with the parties 
-- their clients (if the intermediaries are "outsiders") or leaders (if intermediaries are "insiders") -- 
before significant agreements can be made. To add to the complexity here, even the principals 
themselves in direct face-to-face negotiations may have to deal with their constituents before 
such agreements are made and/or implemented: husbands and wives may need to confer with 
their children and/or other relatives; and heads of state may have to consult with their ministers 
and national legislatures (e.g., Russian President Yeltsin consulting with the Duma [the lower 
house of the Russian parliament] concerning the ratification of the START II strategic arms 
treaty that was signed in January 1993 and ratified by the U.S. Senate in 1996 [see Baker, 
1998]). A special problem for those who have to return to their leaders or constituents and "sell" 
them on an agreement to which they were not a party is re-entry (see Burton, 1987, pp. 69-70; 
Burton and Dukes, 1990, pp. 136-138, 207-208; Mitchell and Banks, 1996, pp. 130-143; Ch. 6).  
As the analyst begins to read further into the appropriate literature and to talk with experts and 
the parties themselves as a necessary precondition to designing and implementing an effective 
intervention, he or she would want to explore to what extent, if any, the conflict in question is 
interlocked with other conflicts (see Kriesberg, 1980, 1982). If, for instance, any one party is 
itself conflicted, it would be difficult for it to deal effectively with a conflict it has with another 
party unless it first deals with its own internal conflicts.(6)  
Intrapsychic conflicts are an interesting subset here, in part, because conflict resolution training 
often does not deal with them: there is the view among some practitioners that "we are not 
therapists!"; ergo, we do not deal with the intrapsychic level. The problem with this attitude, 
however, is that in protracted, deep-rooted conflicts, individuals will often have been brutalized 
to the extent that any attempt to bring them together to deal with their "inter-party" conflicts may 
fail unless their internal wounds are dealt with first; hence, the emphasis that some theorists and 
practitioners put on healing and reconciliation (see, e.g., Montville, 1993; Lederach, 1997).  
Among the categories of conflicts that may characterize the intrapsychic level are motivational 
conflicts; for instance, conflicts involving equally attractive choices (approach-approach); 
equally unattractive choices (avoidance-avoidance); or some combination of choices, each 
characterized by attractive and unattractive elements (approach-avoidance; double approach-
avoidance) (see Brown, 1957; M. Deutsch, 1971).  
Avoidance-avoidance conflicts -- where individuals face equally unpleasant choices -- has been 
captured by William Styron's (1979) Sophie's Choice where, upon arrival at a Nazi death camp 
during World War II:  
 
A Jewish mother is told by a Nazi guard to select which of her two children is to be killed, and if 
she refuses to make the choice both will be killed (M. Deutsch, 1971, p. 43).  
 
As Morton Deutsch puts it:  
 
There is no constructive solution to such a conflict except to outlaw it. This type of conflict 
involves not merely being "damned if you do and damned if you don't" but being damned by 
oneself (ibid.).  
 
More generally, avoidance-avoidance conflicts can characterize members of minority groups 
who, having no legitimate way out of their cultural, social, political, and economic ghettoes -- in 
effect, being denied access to the resources presided over and typically enjoyed by members of 
majority groups -- find that they are often faced with equally unattractive choices.  
The point here is that an individual may be unable to choose between roughly equally-weighted 
options -- whether they are both attractive or unattractive -- or is unable to choose any one 
particular option because its positive elements are canceled out by its negative ones. In such 
cases, the individual enters into, and perhaps remains mired in, a decision-making quandary, 
from which, perhaps -- with the possible exception of avoidance-avoidance situations -- a gifted 
third party can strive to extricate him or her through reframing (e.g., by encouraging the 
individual to alter the values attached to options or parts of options).(7)  
Other examples of intrapsychic conflicts include role-set and multiple-position conflicts (see 
Thompson and Van Houten, 1970, pp. 143-144). A "role-set conflict" is a conflict between two 
or more parts of the same role; e.g., a married woman might feel torn between her wifely and 
motherly duties -- two aspects of the role of "married woman." In a "multiple position conflict," 
there is a conflict between two or more roles; e.g., a woman may experience tension between her 
roles as a married woman and as a working woman.(8)  
Consider also the case of an insider-partial mediator (see Wehr and Lederach, 1991) -- one who 
is regionally, culturally and/or otherwise connected to a particular conflict -- who may be 
conflicted between his or her sense of the third party role on the one hand,and on the other, his or 
her sense of connectedness or antipathy to one of the parties. But even an outsider-neutral third 
party might experience "dissonance" (see Festinger, 1962) as part of a personal conflict between, 
for instance, the needs for, on the one hand, "justice" (arresting, prosecuting, and punishing 
perpetrators of genocide) and on the other, "reconciliation" in Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
elsewhere.  
An inclusion of the intrapsychic level in interventions dealing with otherwise interparty conflicts 
-- especially of a deep-rooted, violent nature -- is compatible with an observation I have made 
elsewhere (Sandole, 1987, p. 296):  
 
Once individuals in conflict -- whether at the interpersonal, intergroup, interorganizational, 
international or any other level -- start to express themselves through [violent means], they may 
become brutalized, unable to view their "enemies" as anything but despicable subhumans. Under 
such circumstances, which can lead to an extension of the conflict beyond the lives of its original 
participants [e.g., as in Northern Ireland or the Balkans], potential third parties who wish to 
intervene effectively must be able to operate at the intrapsychic as well as interparty levels. 
Unless the first is dealt with adequately, the second may only worsen (emphasis added).(9)  
 
Once the intrapsychic level of "parties" has been addressed, the conflict analyst can then move 
on to the interparty level, where one question to answer is, are the parties symmetrical 
("homogeneous") or asymmetrical ("heterogeneous") in terms of type, character, or purpose (see 
Boulding, 1962, pp. 166-167; Rapoport, 1974, pp. 175-176)? A related, albeit more critical 
question is, are the parties balanced or unbalanced in terms of power and other resources (see 
Curle, 1971, pp. 5-8), including access to authority (see Dahrendorf, 1959)? While this question 
itself may be relatively easy to answer (disregarding for the moment the difficulties involved in 
"measuring" power [see Couloumbis and Wolfe, 1986, Ch. 5]), its implications for the third party 
role are far less easy to deal with. In this regard, there is an ongoing debate in the conflict 
resolution community between those who argue that third parties should not endeavor to alter 
unbalanced power relationships and those who argue that third parties should, indeed, endeavor 
to empower originally disenfranchised parties. For the former (see, e.g., Colosi, 1987), a strict 
adherence to the tenets of neutrality is what keeps the process on course, credible in the eyes of 
the disputants; whereas for the latter (see, e.g., Laue, 1987), agreements are not likely to be long-
lasting if the asymmetrical relationships within which problems have arisen remain intact.  
My own view is that as long as the parties remain locked in a relationship reflective of what 
Johan Galtung (1969) has conceptualized as structural violence -- situations of unfair access to 
political, economic, and other resources because of one's involuntary membership in certain 
ethnic, religious, racial, and/or other groups -- then any agreement they may arrive at will not 
have dealt with the underlying causes and conditions of their conflict and, hence, their conflict 
will likely resurface at some later time.(10)  
Consider, for instance, the case of a wife and husband in a divorce mediation. The wife has asked 
that her husband pay her a monthly sum in addition to childcare to enable her to complete her 
university education, which she had earlier ceased pursuing once children came into the 
relationship. The husband rejects her request, on the grounds that he is bound to pay only for 
maintenance of their children, whom she will continue to raise. Assuming a male/female 
comediation team, the male mediator may then ask to "caucus" with the husband in a one-on-one 
session in an adjoining room, while his female colleague remains with the wife.(11) During that 
session, the male mediator "reality-tests" the husband's original objection, sharing with him the 
view that, if the husband were to respond favorably to his wife's request, once she completed her 
university education, she would then be "empowered" to obtain better-paying jobs in the future, 
perhaps thereby releasing the husband from providing child support beyond a certain level and/or 
time.  
By "reframing" the wife's request in a way that is in the interests of the husband as well, the male 
comediator may have encouraged the husband to accept what he had originally rejected. This 
would be a case of a win-win agreement facilitated by the third party "violating" a strict reading 
of "neutrality" in the short run in order to remain "impartial" to both parties in the long run, 
helping them to arrive not only at an agreement, but one that is in both their interests and, 
therefore, more likely to last.  
 
Issues  
 
Once the conflict analyst has identified the parties and dealt with other aspects of the "who?" -- 
including the extent to which the conflict in question is "interlocked" with other conflicts, 
including intraparty ones -- then she or he is able to explore the "what?": the issues about which 
the parties claim to be conflicting. The obvious question that comes to mind here is, What are 
the parties fighting about?  
First of all, conflicts may be structural (Moore, 1986, p. 27), dealing with issues which call into 
question whole systems -- e.g., belief/value (theoretical, behavioral), biological, or physical 
systems -- or nonstructural, dealing with the means for achieving goals within systems.(12) 
Secondly, among specific categories of issues which may or may not call into question whole 
systems, Moore (1986, p. 27) talks about data, interest, relationship, and value conflicts. Wehr 
(1979, p. 20) refers to facts-based, values-based, and interests-based conflicts. Rapoport (1974, 
p. 174) mentions rights or privileges, control over resources, political power, and/or the very 
existence of the disputants themselves. And Morton Deutsch (1973, pp. 15-17) talks about 
control over resources, preferences and nuisances, values, beliefs, and/or the nature of the 
relationship between the parties.  
There is clearly some overlap here, with the following appearing to be common (structural or 
nonstructural) issues in conflict:  
 
Relationships ("It is Simmel's [1955] contention ... that conflict is a component of all social 
relationships" [emphasis added] [Coser, 1956, p. 73]. And: "First and foremost is the perhaps 
self-evident but oft-neglected notion that relationship is the basis of both the conflict and its 
long-term solution" [Lederach, 1997, p. 26]);  
Values (conflicts about what "should be," including ideological conflict [see Mack and Snyder, 
in Smith, 1971, p. 10; Burton, 1962, pp. 11-22]);  
Beliefs/data (conflicts about what "is"); and  
Control over resources/interests (conflicts "over who will get what in the distribution of scarce 
resources" [Wehr, 1979, p. 20]).  
Among the latter, conflicts over "territory" are what Burton (1962, pp. 6-8) has termed "classical 
conflicts." Indeed, according to Vasquez (1993), a major issue in war is territory (ibid., Ch. 4): 
"of all the possible issues that could end in war, issues involving territorial contiguity are indeed 
the most war prone" (ibid., p. 125), to the extent that territoriality may be a "soft-wired" part of 
human nature (ibid., pp. 139-140).  
Beyond the above typologies, there are, as in "parties," some less obvious aspects of "issues" that 
the analyst might want to pay attention to as preconditions to designing and implementing an 
appropriate intervention. Lewis Coser (1956, pp. 48-55), for instance, makes a distinction 
between realistic and nonrealistic conflicts: is a particular conflict really about something (e.g., 
territory) or does it reflect a need to release bottled-up emotions?(13) This distinction can be a bit 
more complex than might otherwise appear to be the case, overlapping with the intrapsychic 
level of "parties" discussed above. For instance, a "realistic" conflict may have, as one of its 
sources, a "nonrealistic" component: bottled-up rage from an earlier conflict with others that has 
never found release that, through the psychological mechanism of (negative) transference, gets 
shifted to the conflict at hand (see Levine, 1952, pp. 332-339; Coville, et al., 1960, pp. 247-248). 
As Morton Deutsch (1973, p. 14) has indicated, a conflict may start out as false -- with no 
"objective" basis -- but elicit new motives and attitudes that transform it into a true conflict.(14)  
The implications here for the potential third party add to the complexity of conflict, as she or he 
may first have to deal with the "nonrealistic" component -- the original conflict -- before dealing 
with the "realistic" conflict at hand.(15) Hence, as argued above, the third party intervener may 
first have to deal with the intrapsychic level as a necessary condition to dealing effectively with 
the interparty level. How one should do this, of course, may not always be clear. One approach is 
to ensure that the "third party" comprises a number of people -- e.g., what John Burton and his 
colleagues call a panel (see Burton, 1969, Ch. 5; 1987, Part X; Mitchell and Banks, 1996, Chs. 4-
5) -- in general, to capture the "complexity" of conflict, but specifically, to include a therapist 
who knows how to listen and respond to individuals whose current "realistic" conflicts are based, 
in part, on the unresolved affect ("nonrealistic" component) of earlier "realistic" conflicts. But 
even if a therapist is not available, merely providing parties with the opportunity to "vent" and to 
tell their "stories" without interruption may provide the necessary catharsis.  
Apropos other typologies of conflict and corresponding categories of "issues," Morton Deutsch 
(1973, pp. 13-14) distinguishes between "displaced" (right parties, but wrong issues); 
"misattributed" (contrived, i.e., wrong parties and wrong issues); and "latent" (pre-MCP) 
conflicts (conflicts that should be occurring, but are not).  
Under displaced conflicts, imagine a couple who argue a great deal about what to watch on 
television, or where to go for their vacation, or about their children. They never argue about their 
own relationship, which may be the "real" issue, because to do so would be to call into question 
that very relationship which otherwise means a great deal to them. So the dilemma here for a 
potential third party -- who realizes that until the "real" issue is addressed, the conflict will not be 
resolved -- is, should he or she facilitate the couple becoming aware of the underlying issue, even 
though, to do so, may incur the wrath of one or both of the parties?  
A similar dilemma exists for the potential third party who observes that a latent conflict exists 
between two or more parties; e.g., that they may be in an unperceived "structurally violent" 
relationship.(16) Should one bring it to the parties' attention, including the "happy slaves," and 
possibly incur their wrath, or avoid the situation altogether? My own preference here would be to 
meet with the originally more powerful party and share with them my observations that a certain 
situation exists and that unless it is dealt with, sooner or later, it is likely to blow up in 
everybody's faces. Hence, from a proactive instead of traditional reactive point of view, the time 
for action is at that point before, and not after, the explosion. This is also an argument in favor of 
early warning/preventive diplomacy (see Boutros-Ghali, 1992; Lund, 1996): rather than wait for 
the "house to catch on fire" when an MCP has escalated into an AMCP, deal with the "incendiary 
materials" beforehand when the conflict is still at the latent or even MCP stage.  
Misattributed conflicts -- or what Clark Kerr (1954, p. 234) refers to as induced conflicts -- are 
what political leaders in distress sometimes do in order to remain in power: create conflicts with 
others as a way to redirect internal dissent away from them and onto those others. This is what I 
call the oldest proposition (maxim) in the study (practice) of politics: "when the 'natives' (a 
leader's constituents) are restless, threaten to go to war." The thinking of Bodin (1955), Simmel 
(1955), and Coser (1956) is relevant here, as is that of Volkan (1985, 1988): conflict with the 
outside at any level can be "functional" for the inside, even for the individual personality. Hence, 
as Rapoport (1974, p. 174) puts it:  
 
In many cases, ..., the stated issues cannot be taken seriously, because they are too often used for 
the purpose of rallying support rather than to define goals to be achieved.  
 
Countless examples of "misattributed" conflict exist, including those associated with the wars in 
former Yugoslavia. Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic, for example, visited Kosovo in 1987, on 
nearly the 600th anniversary of the Ottoman Turkish conquest and launching of their 500-year 
occupation of the area, pronouncing that "never again" will anyone do this to the Serbs. His 
actions in this regard are linked to the genocidal warfare in Croatia, Bosnia, and now, as of this 
writing, even in Kosovo itself -- apparently, all as part of his effort to maintain his hold on what 
remains of the former Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) (see Sandole, 1999, Ch. 7). In this 
sense, misattributed conflicts can be viewed as a means for maintaining what Burton (1979, p. 73 
and Ch. 7) calls role defence.  
 
Objectives  
 
Corresponding to the distinction discussed above under "issues," between (a) changes of means 
within systems and (b) changes of systems themselves, parties' overall objectives can include 
status-quo maintaining ("stability," achieved via "balancing" or "hegemony") or status-quo 
changing ("revolutionary") goals (see Lerche and Said, 1970, pp. 147-150; Kissinger, 1964, p. 1 
[cited in Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, 1997, pp. 78-80]). Conflicts characterized by such zero-sum 
("win-lose") goals -- where one party's gains equal another party's losses -- can be nightmarish 
for the potential third party: what, after all, can one do if one party wants to maintain a certain 
state of affairs while the other -- perhaps realizing that it is in a "structurally violent relationship" 
with a hegemon -- wants to change it in a revolutionary way?  
This is one of the defining features of the post-Cold War world, characterized in part by a 
fundamental clash between two aspects of international law; i.e., there are those who want to 
maintain the territorial integrity of their new states (e.g., Azerbaijan, Georgia, Russian 
Federation, Serbia) and those who wish to exercise their rights to self-determination and break 
away from those states, forming their own in the process (e.g., Armenians in Azerbaijan 
[Nagorno Karabakh], Abkhazians and Ossetians in Georgia [Abkhazia and South Ossetia], 
Chechnyans in the Russian Federation [Chechnya], Albanians in Serbia [Kosovo] [see, e.g., 
Rosenfeld, 1998]). What can a third party possibly do to facilitate "win-win" agreements in 
situations characterized by such stark, diametrically opposed goals?  
Suggestive of a possible way out, Roger Fisher and William Ury (1981, p. 59) use the "orange 
metaphor" to illustrate how, typically, parties to conflicts, even when they think they are being 
sensible, shortchange themselves from what Pruitt (1987) calls integrative agreements: In a 
conflict between two sisters over an orange, the girls opt to "compromise" and cut the orange in 
half, without realizing that one wanted the fruit, while the other wanted the peel. So, instead of 
each sister achieving 100 percent of her goals (one sister, the fruit; the other, the peel), each gets 
50 percent and therefore, less of what she wants -- clearly a less durable solution!  
How can the, arguably, simplistic "orange metaphor" be of any use in complex conflicts 
concerning self-determination and territorial integrity in the Southern Caucasus, Russian 
Federation, and the Balkans? While, on the one hand, such conflicts appear to be an intellectual 
puzzle without apparent resolution, on the other hand, the Swedes and Finns have found an 
"integrative agreement" with regard to the Aland Islands, where Finland retains sovereignty over 
territory inhabited by an autonomous Swedish community with its own legislature, flag, stamps, 
control over its own state television and radio broadcasts, and "a slightly different version of the 
Finnish passport" (see OSCE Review, 1997). So, with some creative reframing of what the 
parties "really" want -- even including the "classical" issue of territory -- the "orange metaphor" 
may, indeed, offer some insights about how to deal with otherwise complex, apparently 
intractable conflict situations, including one of the most intractable of all: determining the final 
status of Jerusalem (see Segal, 1998).  
 
Means  
 
One typology of means which parties can use for achieving their objectives has been suggested 
by Anatol Rapoport's classic Fights, Games, and Debates (1960; 1974, pp. 180-183): in fights, 
parties define each other as "enemies" to be destroyed; in games, they define each other as 
opponents to be outwitted; and in debates, they define each other as opponents to be persuaded 
or converted to each's point of view (also see K.W. Deutsch, 1978, Ch. 11).  
From an early warning/preventive diplomacy point of view, a potential third party would want to 
intervene at the latent conflict (pre-MCP) stage, where, if the parties were not quite "dialoguing," 
at least they would not yet be in a "fight" (an AMCP). Once the "house catches on fire," then the 
third party would want to facilitate de-escalation from a fight to a dialogue: clearly no mean feat, 
especially given that, in such emotionally charged circumstances, the parties are likely to be 
overperceiving and overreacting to each other (see O. Holsti, et al., 1968; and Zinnes, et al., 
1961), generating conflict spirals (see Pruitt and Rubin, 1986, Ch. 6) and what I call negative 
self-fulfilling prophecies (NSFPs) (see Sandole, 1987; Pruitt and Rubin, 1986, Ch. 7), where 
conflicts-as-process overwhelm and overtake conflicts-as-startup conditions, such that AMCPs 
become self-stimulating and self-perpetuating (see Sandole, 1999).  
 
Orientations  
 
The "means" that parties use to achieve their objectives may be reflective of their underlying 
orientations to conflict and conflict handling. If the parties are characterized by a competitive 
orientation, they will tend to be adversarial, confrontational, and view conflict as a zero-sum 
("win-lose") game; and if cooperative, they will tend to be nonadversarial, nonconfrontational, 
and view conflict in positive-sum ("win-win") terms (see M. Deutsch, 1973). Another way to 
think of orientations is in terms of the Thomas-Kilmann conflict styles typology, with the various 
options located along a competitive/cooperative conflict-handling gradient, from, e.g., 
competing, avoiding, compromising, and accommodating, to collaborating (Thomas, 1975).  
Still another way to think here is in terms of the cultures (see Avruch and Black, 1987, 1993; 
Avruch, et al., 1991; Avruch, 1998), worldviews or paradigms (see Kuhn, 1970; Sandole, 1984, 
1986, 1987, 1988, 1993, 1999), within which orientations are embedded. For instance, parties 
tending more toward the competitive side of the conflict-handling gradient might be 
characterized by Realpolitik worldviews, with a negative view of human nature and a severely 
circumscribed sense of the possibility of systemic (environmental) and behavioral change; in 
contrast to those tending more toward the cooperative side, who might be reflective of 
Idealpolitik worldviews, with a more optimistic view of human nature and the possibility of 
change (see Sandole, 1993, 1999).  
Realpolitik-influenced actors, associated with competitive approaches to conflict and conflict 
handling, may, through their more likely engagement in "fights," also be associated with 
destructive outcomes; in contrast to Idealpolitik-influenced actors, predisposed to cooperative 
approaches, who are more likely to be involved in debates associated with constructive 
outcomes. However, reflective of the "complexity" of the identity-based conflicts of the post-
Cold war world, when the basic human needs of normally Idealpolitik-type actors for 
recognition, identity, and security (see Burton, 1997), have been violated and frustrated, these 
actors, too, might be associated with competitive approaches, fights, and destructive outcomes. 
We have here, in other words, an example of equifinality: different paradigmatic sources of 
violent conflict behavior. In any case, as Kriesberg reminds us, "escalation [of MCPs into 
AMCPs] is not inevitable and endless" (1982, p. 319); conflicts can, indeed, be "waged 
constructively" (1998).  
 
Environments  
 
Conflict analysts and potential third parties would also want to know whether parties' 
conflict/conflict handling environments contain or do not contain mechanisms for controlling or 
resolving conflicts. According to Rapoport (1974, p. 175), there are endogenous conflicts:  
 
wherein the conflicting systems are parts of a larger system that has its own mechanisms for 
maintaining a steady state, which may include mechanisms for controlling or resolving conflict 
between the sub-systems;  
 
in contrast to exogenous conflicts, where "there may be no "super-system to exercise control or 
resolve conflict".(17)  
If an environment is primarily exogenous within which a latent conflict or MCP is developing or 
an AMCP is in full bloom, then a third party would have to work much harder than would be the 
case in a primarily endogenous environment, to move the parties away from fights and toward 
debates. To the extent that the third party is successful, she or he (or they) might want to 
encourage the parties, as part of their agreement, to put mechanisms in place such that, "next 
time," they do not have to "burn the house down." What we are talking about here is helping the 
parties to craft a response to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's dictum that "wars occur because there is 
nothing to prevent them."  
If, on the other hand, an environment is basically endogenous, but the parties are unaware of the 
availability of existing mechanisms, then the third party can sensitize and work with them to 
activate such mechanisms; e.g., the various early warning, conflict prevention, and dispute 
resolution mechanisms associated with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(OSCE); e.g., the High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) (see Hopmann, 
forthcoming; OSCE Annual Report, 1997; OSCE Mechanisms and Procedures, 1998; Zaagman 
and Thorburn, 1997).  
Once conflict analysts/potential third parties have ascertained answers to these and other 
questions subsumed under Pillar 1 concerning parties, issues, objectives, means, orientations, and 
environments,(18) they are then poised to deal with Pillar 2: the causes and conditions of a 
particular latent conflict, MCP, or AMCP. They have to understand what drives the conflict 
before they can decide what, if anything, they can do about it.  
 
CONFLICT CAUSES AND CONDITIONS (PILLAR 2)  
 
Given the complexity of conflict, under conflict causes and conditions, conflict analysts and 
potential third parties would want to know about the potential sources of conflict operative at, 
e.g., the (a) individual (biological, physiological, psychological); (b) societal (political, 
economic, social); (c) international; and (d) global/ecological levels (see Waltz, 1959; North, 
1990). No matter at what level a conflict occurs -- at the interpersonal, intergroup, 
interorganizational, or international levels -- factors operative at each of these four explanatory 
levels may be impacting the conflict (although, depending upon the level at which the conflict 
occurs, perhaps in terms of varying "weights"). And if the causes and conditions of a conflict are 
multi-level, then attempts to deal with it must be multi-level as well.  
A major problem here is that most of us obtain our degrees or otherwise become professionally 
competent in terms of only one field; e.g., we are either biologists, psychologists, 
anthropologists, historians, sociologists, political scientists, international relationists, 
philosophers, or something else (including "scholar" or "practitioner"), but not "all of the above." 
This disciplinary fragmentation of knowledge into zealously guarded "sovereign units" breeds 
arrogant ethnocentrism and comedic, if not also dangerous replays of the scenario of the three 
blind men, each assuming that the bit of the elephant he has grabbed onto represents the totality 
of the beast.  
Again, given the complexity of conflict -- and the compelling thesis of complexity theory that 
"everything is connected to everything else" (see Waldrop, 1992), including "nature" and 
"nurture" (see Sandole, 1999, Ch. 8) -- we need all the bits or, in our case, levels represented. 
Otherwise, the equally compelling tendency toward single-factor, "parsimonious" theories may 
further exacerbate, rather than facilitate solutions to, complex problems.  
Accordingly, I have identified a variety of potential causes and conditions of violent conflict 
operative at the four explanatory levels, from which I have distilled the following embryonic 
generic theory (see Sandole, 1993; 1999, Ch. 6):  
(1) There appears to be a physiological mechanism (inclusive of, e.g., the hypothalamus and 
amygdala) that requires some kind of stimulation to be activated to produce violent reactions, 
which can nevertheless be influenced by learning (Scott, 1958; Bandura, 1973).  
(2) During periods of threatened or actual violations of an actor's basic needs for, among others, 
recognition, identity, and security, which may reflect territoriality (Vasquez, 1993), elements of 
this physiological mechanism (specifically, the limbic system) may come to dominate the actor's 
"neocortical rationality" (an example of MacLean's [1975, 1978] schizophysiology), increasing 
the probability of a violent response to the perceived source (or a surrogate of the source) of the 
frustrated needs (Davies, 1962, 1973, 1986; Burton, 1979, 1990a, 1990b, 1997; Dollard, et al., 
1939).  
(3) Frustration can be fed by perceived structural (and cultural) violence (Galtung, 1969, 1996) 
at various levels of the actor's external environment, e.g., rank disequilibrium (Galtung, 1964) or 
relative deprivation (Gurr, 1970).  
(4) The frustration-of-needs/aggression nexus is both stimulated by, and in turn stimulates, 
ethnocentrism (Sumner, 1906) and Realpolitik.  
(5) When two or more actors so characterized are parties to a conflict, then frustration-of-
needs/aggression can generate a quasi-deterministic spiral, reflective of Richardson's (1939, 
1960) action-reaction processes (where "men" in particular do "stop to think," but in terms of 
Realpolitik), with reciprocal, "imitated" increases in the capability to wage war, and in other 
"steps to war" (Vasquez, 1993). The more involved in this process the actors become, the more 
they will tend to overperceive and overreact to threatened and actual assaults to needs (Zinnes, et 
al., 1961; O. Holsti, et al., 1968), even in cases where their capabilities have been reduced (Leng, 
1983). This will fuel further the spiral (and MacLean's schizophysiology/Koestler's [1967, 1978] 
"Ghost in the Machine"), and increase the probability of generating negative self-fulfilling 
prophecies (NSFPs) (Sandole, 1984, 1986, 1987).  
(6) These NSFPs may be reflective of self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes as 
well as of action-reaction processes, or a combination of both. Action-reaction processes can 
operate independently of self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes (eigendynamik), 
but over time, in protracted conflict situations, will probably give rise to the latter (a "culture of 
violence"). These can then either operate independently of action-reaction processes or 
encourage their development, such that action-reaction processes can be viewed as a special case 
of self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes. In either case, regardless of which is 
"chicken" and which is "egg," each of these two variants of NSFPs would seem to be able to give 
rise to, and interact with the other.  
(7) NSFPs, or conflicts-as-process (as well as conflicts-as-startup conditions [e.g., relative 
deprivation]) can be further exacerbated by environmental "shocks" and uncertainties associated 
with developments at the international and global level: among others, proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (M. Kaplan, 1957); the "Malthusian nightmare revisited" (Choucri and 
North, 1975; Clark, 1989; Mathews, 1992; Homer-Dixon, 1991; Homer-Dixon, et al., 1993); the 
collapse of previously existing political and other systems, and corresponding increases in the 
number of political units and in territorial contiguity; and increases in the amount of violence and 
war worldwide.  
(8) "Conflict-as-process" is where third parties enter the scene, and their "trick" is to create the 
"magic" by which Realpolitik-driven competitive processes can be replaced (or at least 
supplemented) by Idealpolitik-based cooperative processes of conflict resolution.  
 
CONFLICT INTERVENTION (PILLAR 3)  
 
This takes us into conflict intervention where, prior to acting, various types of potential third 
parties -- e.g., activists, advocates, researchers (fact-finders), mediators (trainers), enforcers 
(see Laue and Cormick, 1978; Laue, 1987; Kriesberg, 1982, Ch. 7; and Mitchell, 1993) -- would 
want to be clear about their own objectives, which could include any or some combination of the 
following:  
(a) (violent) conflict prevention: stop the house from catching on fire (e.g., the mission of the UN 
Preventive Deployment Force [UNPREDEP] in Macedonia);  
(b) conflict management: prevent an existing fire from spreading (e.g., the mission of the UN 
Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in Bosnia);  
(c) conflict settlement: put the fire out, forcefully if necessary (e.g., the NATO bombing of 
Bosnian Serb positions in August and September 1995 and subsequent missions of the NATO-
led Implementation Force [IFOR] and Stabilization Force [SFOR] in Bosnia);  
(d) conflict resolution: deal with the underlying causes and conditions (the "incendiary 
materials") of the fire at hand; and  
(e) conflict transformation (provention): deal with the long-term relationships among the 
surviving occupants of the house, and between them and their "neighbors," such that, "next 
time," they can resort to less lethal means of conflict handling than burning down the house (e.g., 
the objectives of the European Union [EU] to transcend the narrowly defined sovereignties and 
nationalisms of the state system, and achieve common ["win-win"] security).  
To put this another way, in terms of categories developed by former UN Secretary General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992), potential third parties would want to be clear about whether their 
objectives were: (1) preventive diplomacy ([violent] conflict prevention); (2) peacemaking 
(conflict settlement/resolution); (3) peacekeeping (conflict management); and/or (4) 
peacebuilding (conflict resolution/transformation [provention]).  
No matter how the third party conceives of his or her goals, in order to facilitate achieving any 
one of them, any sequenced combination, or all of them, timing will be a factor (see Wehr, 1979; 
Kriesberg, 1982, 1987; Moore, 1986; Zartman, 1989; Haass, 1990; Stedman, 1991; Kleiboer, 
1994; and Mitchell, 1995/1996, forthcoming). Also, she or he can reflect or otherwise choose 
any of the following orientations to conflict handling:  
(a) competitive and cooperative processes (see above);  
(b) negative peace (prevention/cessation of hostilities) and positive peace (elimination of 
underlying causes and conditions of hostilities, including structural [and cultural] violence); and  
(c) track-1 (governmental) and track-2 (nongovernmental) processes of conflict resolution (see 
McDonald and Bendahmane, 1987; Diamond and McDonald, 1996).  
Traditionally, track-1 (governmental) actors have used competitive processes (but more and 
more, cooperative processes as well) to achieve and maintain negative peace (elimination of 
hostilities). Negative peace is fine as far as it goes, but since it does not deal with underlying 
causes and conditions, it may not go far enough: the "peace" will remain fragile, always at risk of 
breaking down (e.g., as in Cyprus or Bosnia). Track-2 (nongovernmental) actors, on the other 
hand, use cooperative processes -- e.g., training,(19) problemsolving workshops, facilitation, 
conciliation, mediation (with more of a transformational than a transactional bent(20)) -- to 
achieve and maintain positive peace (see Burton, 1969, 1987, 1990a, 1997; Burton and Dukes, 
1990; Fisher and Keashly, 1991; Kelman, 1990; Mitchell and Banks, 1996).  
There is a need, therefore, for a "paradigm shift," not to replace track 1 with track 2, but, as a 
testimony to the complexities of post-Cold War conflicts, to complement one with the other, 
using whatever it takes -- singly or in combination, once or in sequence (see Fisher and Keashly, 
1991) -- to deal with conflicts at various stages in their development.(21)  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
What we have attempted here is to lay out the parameters (and some content) of a comprehensive 
mapping of conflict and conflict resolution, initially at the macro level as a basis for organizing 
information on the field as a whole, but also at the micro level which we believe to be useful for 
(a) determining what is going on in any (potential) conflict situation and (b) why, before (c) we 
can decide what, if anything, we can do about it. Although a variation on the theme of the 
rational actor model, we think that the mapping can be helpful in emotionally charged situations 
where even third parties are not immune!  
And just as police officers and peacekeepers carry laminated plastic cards indicating their "rules 
of engagement,"(22) so we believe that third parties can carry cards containing something like the 
basic structure of the three-pillar mapping proposed here (again, see Figure 1) as a checklist of 
what to pay attention to, and in what order, when "the going gets tough"!(23) Some caveats are in 
order here: the conflict analyst/potential third party should realize that the 3-pillar mapping 
represents a static listing of items, e.g., potential "startup conditions." Once a latent conflict has 
developed into an MCP, or an MCP has escalated into an AMCP, a "conflict-as-startup 
conditions" may be overtaken by a "conflict-as-process." What this means is that the third party 
must deal first with the dynamic "process" -- must first put out the "fire" -- before dealing with 
the "startup conditions," keeping in mind that, "[b]ecause a conflict is a social process and is 
continually changing, any map of it will be valid for only a certain period of time and must be 
periodically updated" (Wehr, 1979, p. 19); also, that his or her "mere presence" in the "conflict 
space" of the parties will likely affect it in some way, thereby rendering problematic concepts 
such as objectivity and even neutrality itself. As Laue (1987, p. 20) puts it:  
 
All intervention alters the power configuration among the parties, thus all conflict intervention is 
advocacy. There are no neutrals (emphasis added). (Also see Kriesberg, 1982, Ch. 7; Benjamin, 
1990; Cobb and Rifkin, 1991; Sandole, 1984, 1987.)  
And here we return to the "two-culture problem" mentioned earlier: there are those in conflict 
analysis and resolution who deal with "startup conditions" and those who deal with "process." 
Practitioners intervening into "conflicts-as-process" may deal not only initially but only with 
process. The problem is, once the fire has been put out, unless the underlying "startup 
conditions" -- the "incendiary materials" -- are dealt with, the fire may reoccur.  
The violent ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia are classic examples in this regard. Through 
conflict-settlement/conflict-management (peacemaking/peacekeeping) measures, the Dayton 
Peace accords have stopped the "conflict-as-process" in Bosnia; they have imposed negative 
peace on the warring Croats, Serbs, and Bosniacs. However, Dayton has yet to achieve positive 
peace: to deal with the long-term, deep-rooted "conflicts-as-startup conditions" through conflict 
resolution and transformation (peacebuilding) measures. The implication is that "conflicts-as-
process" could easily be resurrected in Bosnia (especially given the situation in Kosovo!(24)  
). The mapping should remind us, therefore, that once we pay attention to the immediacy of 
escalating processes -- "fires" -- there are long-term conditions that we have to deal with later on.  
To conclude, what we have attempted here is to give some "order" to the bewildering array of 
knowledge on conflict and conflict resolution and in the process, stimulate (further) debate on 
the utility of (the) mapping and allow readers to fill in the blanks themselves, going beyond what 
has been attempted here. The field (and our "global commons") could be better for it!  
Notes  
1. An earlier version, basically an abstract, of this chapter appears in Sandole (1998a).  
2. For a comprehensive treatment of conflict dealing with these (or similar) and other phases, see 
Kriesberg (1982), who has:  
traced the full cycle of any specific social conflict -- from its underlying conditions and 
emergence, to choosing how to conduct the conflict, to its escalation, deescalation, termination, 
and outcome, and, finally, to the longer run and indirect consequences of all that went on before 
(ibid., p. 317).  
3. "Act meaning" refers to the meaning of events and actors' behaviors as defined by the actors 
themselves, while "action meaning" refers to events and the meaning of actors' behaviors as 
defined by observers (see A. Kaplan, 1964, pp. 32-33, 139-143).  
4. This is, perhaps, a major reason why former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev (1987, pp. 
194-195) talked about a "common European home" as a metaphor for emphasizing that common 
security should -- and to some extent, has -- come to characterize post-Cold War relations 
between East and West; more specifically, that any future peace and security arrangement for 
Europe should include all relevant actors (including Russia).  
5. In this regard, Mack and Snyder (1957; in Smith, 1971, p. 10) mention (a) primary, face-to-
face vs. secondary, mediated conflicts; and (b) personal subjective vs. impersonal objective 
conflicts.  
6. Contrariwise, as will be discussed later, conflicts with the "outside" can be useful for the 
"inside," having a beneficial, stabilizing, integrating effect on it (see Bodin, 1955; Simmel, 1955; 
Coser, 1956; Volkan, 1985, 1988).  
7. In avoidance-avoidance cases, the individual may either surrender apathetically to the 
"inevitable" or, metaphorically or otherwise, "blast" his or her way into the consciousness of the 
majority, perhaps at the expense of his/her own and/or others' lives. In effect, it is not hard to 
imagine such an individual engaging in acts of "sabotage" or other acts of "terrorism," at least as 
defined by those against whom such acts are, or are perceived to be, directed.  
8. In this particular example, the multiple-position conflict encompasses the aforementioned 
role-set conflict; i.e., the married woman part of the conflict with the working woman further 
breaks down into the conflicting mother and wife components of the married woman role.  
9. Fred Parkinson (1977, pp. 202-203) has even advanced the provocative argument that, in order 
to operate effectively at the intrapsychic level, potential third parties themselves must first 
undergo self-analysis:  
It would seem ... that before he attempts to act as "mediary" within the difficult and highly 
complex framework of intergroup therapy, the completion of intensive psychoanalysis on the 
part of the therapist would represent an essential requirement. ... It seems ... downright 
astonishing that Burton, Doob, and Kelman -- concerned with the resolution of intergroup 
conflict -- should remain altogether silent on this supremely important aspect of their 
endeavours.  
How can a "mediary" ... be expected to accomplish the task of uncovering hidden motives on the 
part of the disputants without having first gone through the hard discipline of psychoanalysis in 
order to recognize his own subconscious motivations? The latter are bound to come into play at 
some stage in the proceedings. If he is not thus qualified, he will run the grave risk of carrying 
his unrecognized subconscious motivations into the process of intergroup analysis, thus 
complicating rather than facilitating his own task.  
What Parkinson is referring to here, of course, is the interesting (if not fascinating) phenomenon 
of countertransference, whereby intermediaries -- like their counterparts in psychotherapy -- may 
unconsciously, but illogically, inappropriately, and perhaps counterproductively, project "lessons 
learned" from earlier experiences onto the conflict at hand (see Levine, 1952, pp. 339-344).  
10. In recent years, Galtung (1996, p. 196) has added cultural violence to his typology of 
violence; i.e.,  
those aspects of culture, the symbolic sphere of our existence -- exemplified by religion and 
ideology, language and art, empirical science and formal science (logic, mathematics) -- that can 
be used to justify or legitimize direct or structural violence. ... The study of cultural violence 
[thus] highlights the way in which the act of direct violence and the fact of structural violence 
are legitimized and thus rendered acceptable in society (emphasis added).  
11. The principle applied here is a variation on the theme of the peer interview, pioneered by 
Hans Toch (1966), "in which policemen are interviewed by other police officers and violent 
convicts by other inmates" (Megargee and Hokanson, 1970, p. 161). The gender parallelism in 
our case -- with male comediators working with male parties and female comediators, with 
female parties -- also highlights the possibility of gender differences in conflict and conflict-
handling behavior (in this regard, see Pruitt, et al., 1986; Brock-Utne, 1989; Maxwell, 1992; 
Taylor and Miller, 1994; and Fukuyama, 1998).  
12. Correspondingly, Coser (1956, pp. 72-80) talks about basic cleavages vs. conflicts over 
means and subordinate ends within a consensual framework; Kriesberg (1982, Ch. 2) talks about 
dissenual vs. consensual conflicts; Simpson (1937, p. 17) talks about noncommunal conflicts vs. 
communal conflicts (also see Mack and Snyder, in Smith, 1971, p. 10); and Rapoport (1974, p. 
176) talks about structure-oriented conflicts vs. issue-oriented conflicts.  
13. Jessie Bernard makes a similar distinction, between issue conflicts (those that are really about 
something) and illusory conflicts (cited in Boulding, 1965, p. 172). This distinction is not merely 
an "academic" matter, as it has found its way into law enforcement, where hostage-taking and 
barricade situations are seen to fall into instrumental and expressive categories (see Noesner and 
Webster, 1997): "Instrumental behavior" refers to actions that involve substantial demands and 
clear goals that, if achieved, could be beneficial to the hostage-taker (realistic conflict). 
"Expressive behavior", on the other hand, communicates the hostage-taker's frustrations, outrage, 
and despair as well as power; hence, like transference or countertransference (see Levine, 1952, 
pp. 332-344), often appears to be illogical and emotional (nonrealistic conflict). ("Expressive" 
hostage-taking and barricade incidents appear to be more common than "instrumental" ones.)  
On the "realistic" conflict side, Morton Deutsch (1973, pp. 12-13) distinguishes between 
veridical and contingent conflicts: "Veridical" refers to conflicts that exist "objectively," i.e., 
their perceived existence is "not contingent upon some easily altered feature of the environment"; 
whereas the perceived existence of "contingent conflicts" is "dependent upon readily rearranged 
circumstances" which are not recognized immediately by the conflicting parties. "The contingent 
conflict would disappear if the available alternative resources for satisfying the 'conflicting' 
needs were recognized": something a third party could assist in!  
14. In discussing Deutsch's (1969) distinction between manifest and underlying conflicts, Raven 
and Kruglanski (1970, p. 72) point out that "Manifest bases for conflict may be [present, e.g.,] in 
actual inequities ..., but the possibilities for conflict are further increased as the result of 
underlying factors transferred from other situations" (emphasis added).  
15. As Morton Deutsch (1969, p. 10) has argued, the "manifest conflict often cannot be resolved 
more than temporarily unless the underlying conflict is dealt with or unless it can be 
disconnected and separated from the underlying conflict so that it can be treated in isolation" 
(emphasis added) (cited in Raven and Kruglanski, 1970, pp. 71-72) (also see M. Deutsch, 1973, 
p. 13).  
16. Concerning the awareness of conflict, Curle (1971, pp. 8-9) tells us that:  
In many unpeaceful relationships, the parties are perfectly aware of the discordance of their aims. 
In others, however, the conflict is not clearly recognized. Thus, among colonial peoples before 
the independence movements, among many oppressed ... people today..., to some extent among 
students, among some segments of the black American population, and among many black South 
Africans, there [was] little awareness of conflict. It [was] not... obvious to these people that their 
poverty, powerlessness, or subjection, or the injustices they suffered, related directly to the 
riches, power, and authority of the ruling group; that there was, in fact, a conflict of interests. 
Now that these interests have been made manifest, the conflict has become apparent to most of 
those concerned.  
Hence, Louis Kriesberg's (1982, p. xii) comment that, "I recognize the necessity of struggle -- it 
is needed to liberate people, preserve freedom, increase equity, and loosen rigidities."  
17. Correspondingly, see Mack and Snyder's (1957) distinction between institutionalized and 
non-institutionalized conflict (in Smith, 1971, p. 10); Boulding's (1962, pp. 322-323) distinction 
between procedural and violent conflict; and Dahrendorf's (1959, Ch. VI) distinction between 
regulated (legitimate, routinized) and unregulated (illegitimate, uncontrolled) conflict (see Wehr, 
1979, p. 4). Also, see part VIII of Wehr's (ibid., p. 22) Conflict Mapping Guide, concerning the 
"conflict regulation potential" that inheres in any particular conflict/conflict- handling space.  
18. Paralleling or otherwise overlapping with these constituent parts of Pillar 1 are elements of 
Paul Wehr's (1979, pp. 18-22) Conflict Mapping Guide:  
I. Summary Description (one-page maximum);  
II. Conflict History;  
III. Conflict Context;  
IV. Conflict Parties;  
V. Issues;  
VI. Dynamics;  
VII. Alternative Routes to a Solution(s) of the Problem(s);  
as well as  
VIII. Conflict Regulation Potential.  
Similarly, Carpenter and Kennedy (1988, Ch. 4) recommend that potential third parties complete 
a conflict analysis chart, inclusive of the basic elements of a particular conflict: (a) parties; (b) 
issues; (c) interests; (d) importance of issues (high, medium, low); (e) sources of power and 
influence (means); (f) positions and options; and (g) interest in working with other parties.  
19. Apropos training and education in general -- whether used as a form of third-party 
intervention or to produce third parties in the first place -- see Wehr's (1979, pp. 49-54) 
comments, which (overlapping with Pillar 3) include his Conflict Intervention Guide. Also, for a 
listing of organizations involved in conflict regulation training, education, and research, see 
Wehr's Appendices A and B.  
For a discussion of training, university, and other programs and developments associated with 
cooperative trends in conflict resolution as challenges to the paradigmatic dominance of 
realpolitik-based competitive trends, see Sandole (1988). Specifically, for a discussion of the 
graduate programs of the Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (ICAR) at George Mason 
University and their use as a basis for institutionalizing the teaching and practice of conflict 
resolution in Turkey, the former Soviet Union, and Eastern and Central Europe, see Sandole 
(1997).  
20. According to David Maxwell (1992, p. 355):  
The mediator, as a transactional leader, will tend to focus attention on substantive issues rather 
than on qualitative aspects of the parties' relationships with each other. Thus we would expect 
transactional mediators to take a more active role in guiding the parties to a preconceived 
solution. At the same time, the mediator as a transformational leader would be inclined to 
include among the goals to be achieved the quality of the relationship between the parties and a 
more equitable distribution of power (emphasis added).  
21. Some examples of "shifts" in this regard are Michael Lund's (1996) work on developing and 
implementing preventive diplomacy systems and my new European peace and security system 
(NEPSS) (see Sandole, 1997, pp. 135-137; 1998b; 1999, Ch. 7).  
22. See, for example, the "four-page" card issued by the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (Training Unit), entitled, "We Are United Nations Peacekeepers," containing two 
columns of information, one headed by, "We will always:" and the other by, "We will never:".  
23. As a partial example of what we have in mind here, see the card issued by Conflict 
Management, Inc. (CMI) of Cambridge, Massachusetts, with two columns of information, one 
headed, "Negotiation: A Good Outcome", and the other, "Negotiation: Diagnostic Checklist."  
24. In this regard, Senator John W. Warner (R-Va.), Chairman of the U.S. Senate Armed 
Services Committee, has expressed his support for "sending a multinational force [to Kosovo] to 
implement a political settlement" because "instability in Kosovo could spill over to Bosnia and 
negate the slow progress that U.S. and NATO troops have brought about there" (Priest, 1999, p. 
A18).  
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